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Integrating Integration Theory: 
Neo-functionalism and International Regimes 
T H O M A S G E H R I N G 
It is common to juxtapose inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism as the 
two most important, and seemingly mutually exclusive, frameworks to interpret 
the phenomenon of "European integration" and its institutional dimension, the 
European Community.1 
Inter-governmentalism promises to offer a broadly applicable concept for the 
analysis of international cooperative institutions.2 It recognises that the Com-
munity emerged from the self-help based international system and emphasises 
the continuing central role of the member states. However, conceiving of the 
Community as one international institution among many others it tends to 
disregard the specificities of this particular institution. Moreover, inter-govern-
mentalism is conceptionally founded on a state-centred and static approach to 
institutions and cannot, therefore, cope with integration as a process of develop-
ment over time, nor does it readily accommodate the role of non-state actors 
within the Community system. 
1. A single European Community did not formally exist prior to the Maastricht Accord, while the 
same treaty established the "European Union" in which three original Communities are now embedded. 
To ayoid confusion, the present article uses the term "European Communi ty" for the comprehensive 
institution both in its pre-Maastricht and post-Maastricht (i.e. Union) stage. 
2. Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe", Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (1966), pp. 862-915; Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the 
Nation-State in Western Europe Today", journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1982), pp. 
21-37; Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s", in 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The European Community: Decisionmaking and 
Institutional Change (Boulder: Westvievv, 1991), pp. 1-39; Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single 
European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community" , 
International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1991), pp . 651-688; Andrew Moravscik, "Preferences and 
Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter-governmentalist Approach", journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), pp. 473-524. 
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A body of literature that is more or less related to the ideas of neo-functional-
ism avoids these mistakes.3 It is interested in the process of increasing inte-
gration rather than in the interaction of actors in a fairly stable environment. It 
emphasises the dynamics of integration and identifies the role of supranational, 
transnational and sub-national actors in this process. Not least, it is capable of 
taking account of the particularities of the European Community. However, 
beyond description of the Community system neo-functionalism has difficulties 
in accommodating the role of the member states within the integration process. 
Even more problematic, the now exclusive focus on the European Community 
jeopardises theory building because serious theory cannot be built upon and 
tested against one and the same empirical case.4 
Hence, analysts frequently conclude that neither of the two perspectives is 
clearly superior to the other and that both of them contribute to explaining 
empirically observed outcomes.5 Under these conditions theoretical anarchy and 
eclecticism proliferate. 
A closer look at the existing divide reveals that it is made up of two 
interrelated aspects. At the theoretical level a static and state-centred theory is 
juxtaposed with a dynamic theory emphasising the role of supra-national and 
non-state actors. And at the empirical level a broad perspective on a wide range 
of similar institutions is confronted with a view on a phenomenon sui generis 
that is perceived as not really being comparable to anything else. Against this 
backdrop, two questions may be posed: If it is accepted that the European 
Community is an empirically unique phenomenon, does it really need its own 
theory? And vice versa: if it is true that modern neo-functionalism focuses on 
phenomena other than traditional inter-governmentalism, is the European Com-
munity the only empirical subject that may be examined in this way? 
The present paper answers both questions in the negative. It suggests that a 
closer focus on the impact of institutions for governance offers opportunities for 
a fruitful integration of the main approaches to European integration. From an 
institutional perspective the European Community may be interpreted both as 
an institution that has been established by the member states within the 
horizontally organised international system to facilitate and stabilise cooper-
ation, and as a polity within which intra-institutional decision processes take 
3. Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht", International Organiza-
tion, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-39; Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: 
A Political Theory of Legal Integration", International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 41-76; Gary 
Marks, "Structural Policy in the European Community", in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics: 
Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington DC: Brookings, 1992), pp. 
191-224; Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the 
Light of the New Dynamics of the EC", Millennium, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1991), pp. 1-22. On the original 
neo-functionalism, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 
1958); Joseph S. Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revisited Neo-Functionalist Model", in Leon 
N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 192-231; Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional 
Integration", in ibid., pp. 232-264. 
4. James A. Caporaso and John T.S. Keeler, "The European Community and Regional Integration 
Theory", in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey (eds.), The State of the European Union, Vol. 3 (Boulder: 
Lynne Riener, 1995), p. 36. 
5. Alberta M. Sbragia, "Introduction", in Alberta M. Sbragia, op. cit., pp. 1-2; David R. Cameron, "The 
1992 Initiatives: Causes and Consequences", in Sbragia, op. cit., pp. 25-30. 
Integrating Integration Theory 227 
place that allow the participation of non-state actors and, to some degree, even 
hierarchical governance. 
The paper looks first into the common roots of neo-functionalism and regime 
theory and locates them in the middle ground between realism and legalism. 
Subsequently, it develops a concept of institutionalised international governance 
that introduces an institutional perspective into the dominant approach to 
international regimes and applies it to the European Community. Finally, it 
opens the static concept for feedback effects and development over time. 
The paper concludes that the analysis of institutionalised international gover-
nance within the horizontally structured international system may in fact de-
velop an international relations perspective that focuses on horizontal 
coordination among states without simply disregarding the institutional particu-
larities of the Community. Rather, this perspective helps draw attention to the 
differences between regular dynamic international regimes and the Community. 
It is apt to explain why (some) hierarchical governance is possible even without 
serious accumulation of power at the top of the hierarchy. 
From Neo-Functionalism to International Regimes: The Common Roots of 
Theories of Institutionalised Cooperation 
Unlike modern domestic systems (or at least the conceptional model derived on 
their basis) the international system is horizontally, not hierarchically ordered. It 
lacks a powerful entity above its component units (i.e. states) that would be able 
to establish and enforce collectively oriented norms. However, while the 
"anarchy" of the international system relates to this lack of hierarchy, it does not 
necessarily imply absence of order.6 Rather, the evaluation of the consequences 
of international anarchy constitutes a central concern of international relations 
theory. 
Between Legalism and Realism 
Legalism and classical institutionalism start from the assumption that inter-
national anarchy (or its adverse affects) may be overcome by the establishment 
of international organisations and the development of international law.7 Within 
the context of European integration it is reflected in the belief that the adoption 
of a European constitution would itself constitute the key step for transforming 
the European Community into a true federal state.8 Approaches of this type 
attribute a considerable amount of independent influence to international insti-
tutions even without a powerful sanctioning apparatus to enforce collectively 
oriented norms and policies. They assume that an appropriately designed 
institution is capable of steering the decisions of the units and, consequently, of 
taming their otherwise self-interested and occasionally conflict-raising behav-
iour. Hence, the establishment of international institutions itself may be con-
6. Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: a Critique", Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 67-85. 
7. For example, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace through World Law (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 3rd edn, 1966). 
8. Carl J. Friedrich, Europa—Nation im Werden? (Bonn: Europa Union, 1972). 
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ceived of as an important step for the progressive development of international 
relations. 
In contrast, political realism argues that the existence of international anarchy 
will almost automatically lead to a self-help system in which the survival of the 
units (i.e. states) depends first and foremost on their own behaviour.9 Stable 
institutions are believed to constitute merely an epiphenomenon of the already 
existing constellation of power and interests that is not capable of exerting 
independent influence. Therefore, realism warns against following the idealistic 
recommendations of legalism and institutionalism. States are advised to accumu-
late power resources and enhance their position within the system vis-a-vis their 
counterparts as far as possible. In this view it is far less important whether 
cooperation produces mutual gains than how these gains are distributed.10 After 
all, a powerful entity does not exist above the state-level to protect the weaker 
units from adverse action by the stronger ones. Any trust in the ordering power 
of international institutions is completely misconceived and may even aggravate 
conflict if it generates unrealistic expectations. 
These two approaches constitute the extremes on a continuum. While one of 
them believes in the relevance of institutions and recommends their establish-
ment, the other denies their power and warns against relying on them. The 
middle ground between these extremes is occupied by theories which_are less 
optimistic than legalism and traditional institutionalism but also less pessimistic 
than political realism. Generally, they are based on the assumption that situa-
tions frequently allow mutually beneficial collaboration even of self-interested 
actors, rather than being zero-sum. Moreover, they emphasise the beneficial role 
of institutions even in the absence of serious sanctioning power for the establish-
ment, maintenance and development of international collaboration, while taking 
account of the limits of their influence. 
Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and Early Neo-functionalism 
There can be no doubt that functionalism11 and its later refinement, i.e. early 
neo-functionalism,12 set out to occupy this middle ground. They rejected both 
the power-orientation of realism13 and the "grand designs" of legalism and 
traditional institutionalism. Instead, they advocated a strategy of institutionally 
supported incrementalism. They drew attention to the distinction between 
power issues ("high politics") and welfare issues ("low politics") and argued 
that the latter, in contrast to the former, bore the potential for the collective 
pursuit of common interests. Over time, progress in "low politics" would 
9. Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (London: Harper, 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (New York: Knopf, 5th edn, 1973); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Polities (Reading: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
10. Waltz, op. at., p. 105. 
11. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966). 
12. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, op. ät.; Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic 
Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's 
Would-Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). 
13. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1964). 
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produce fundamental political consequences. If peace could be built on its basis, 
it would be a "working peace system", "not a peace that would bring the nations 
quietly apart, but a peace that would bring them actively together".14 
In the highly technocratic functionalist perspective of world politics the proper 
administration of things was expected to produce more appropriate results than 
political governance. Organisations should be established and invested with 
competencies to execute the common interest. Therefore, institutions should be 
shaped according to the functions which they were actually intended to perform 
for (and that is, in the interest of) the actors concerned, i.e. "form should follow 
function".15 Under these conditions institutions were indispensable instruments 
to instigate and support the process of integration and could operate without a 
concentration of sanctioning power. 
Functionalist and neo-functionalist theories focus on the progressive develop-
ment of integration and therefore emphasise the role of "spill over" effects. They 
emphasise the relevance of early institutionalisation of limited cooperation and 
expect its later expansion. From an institutional perspective, "spill over" 
amounts to a (positive) feedback mechanism stressing the possibility of self-sup-
porting social processes that start modestly, gain dynamics and may over time 
produce dramatic outcomes.16 (Neo-) functionalism also draws attention to the 
relevance of sub-national actors for this process, be they citizens or interest-
groups. For Haas, political integration was immediately linked to the emergence 
of "a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones"17 and 
based on the anticipated shift of the loyalty of elites from the national to the 
supranational setting. Accordingly, the establishment of appropriate institutions 
and the transfer of the necessary competencies would decrease the role of the 
participating nation-states at least in relative terms, because other actors were 
expected to partially take over control both at the supranational and at the 
sub-national level. 
However, it should be recalled that Haas developed his argument in direct 
response to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an institution of 
a particularly functionalist shape governing a limited sector of regional relations 
according to criteria quite clearly outlined in the Paris Treaty. Against this 
empirical background he put forward an ideal-type process which should 
eventually lead to federation. 
Collective Decision-making and Integration 
A few years later Lindberg drew a significantly different conclusion from his 
study of European integration. "My own investigations have led me to adopt a 
more cautious conception of political integration, one limited to the develop-
ment of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other 
than autonomous action by national governments".1** It seemed to him that "it is 
logically and empirically possible that collective decision-making procedures 
14. Mitrany, op. cit., p. 51. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Later scholars of regional integration discovered also negative ("spill back") and indifferent 
("spill around") feedback effects; see Schmitter, op. cit. 
17. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, op. at., p. 16. 
18. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, op. cit., p. 5 (emphasis added). 
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involving a significant amount of political integration can be achieved without 
moving toward a "political community" as defined by Haas".19 
It is worth noting that Lindberg did not induce this modification of the 
concept of integration from the dramatic events caused by French foreign policy 
later in the 1960s. Rather, he derived it from his empirical examination of the 
European Economic Community, the one original Community founded on 
general, instead of sector-specific, integration. Apparently, this type of inte-
gration caused different governing mechanisms, presumably because it required 
a constant stream of political, and not merely administrative, decisions. It was 
precisely this Community which unfolded by far the most rapid and dynamic 
development during the past three decades. Accordingly, the integration mech-
anism of the Economic Community that was based on collective decision-mak-
ing could be expected both to dominate the future integration process and to 
move into the centre of academic interest. 
Lindberg's modification disentangled political integration from the fate of the 
participating nation-states and opened neo-functionalism for a more inter-
governmental perspective. While it did not rule out that political integration 
might lead to the emergence of a "new political community", it emphasised the 
possibility that it could remain in a state dominated by collective decision-mak-
ing (supplemented with some delegation of power). It already envisaged a 
Community that was primarily characterised by coordination among the mem-
ber states.20 It was thus not very far from the later conception of a "confederal" 
system in which actors at the supranational (i.e. Community organs), national 
(i.e. governments of the member states), and transnational level (i.e. interest 
groups) operated side by side.21 In a system of this type, which might be stable 
over time without necessarily becoming a true federal state in the medium 
term,22 many problems of coordination and implementation among states arose 
in a similar manner as they did in other settings of international relations.23 
When regional integration as a specific field of academic observation and 
theorising lost its relevance during the early part of the 1970s and was eventu-
ally declared obsolete24 because the hope for the rapid emergence of a Haasian 
"political community" had vanished upon the actual events, two developments 
had blurred the theoretical distinction vis-ä-vis the study of international rela-
tions. Lindberg's turn in perspective and the confederal approach suggested that 
19. Ibid., p. 5. 
20. Not surprisingly, Lindberg employed later on a system-theoretical approach to integrate both 
dimensions. See Leon Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System: Notes toward the 
Construction of a Model", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1967), pp. 344-387. 
21. On confederalism, see Donald J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International 
Integration", lourmil of Common Market Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1972), pp. 267-284, and Paul Taylor, "The 
Politics of the European Communities: The Confederal Phase", World Polities Vol 27 No 3(1975) np 
336-360. 
22. William Wallace, "Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political 
System", in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb (eds.), Policy-Making in tiie European 
Community (Chichester: Wilev, 1983), pp. 403-436. 
23. Donald J. Puchala, "Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonisation in the European Communi-
ties", World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1975), pp. 496-520; Donald J. Puchala, Fiscal Harmonisation in the 
European Communities: National Politics and International Cooperation (London: Pinter, 1984). 
24. Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley CA: Berkeley University, 
Institute of International Studies, 1975). 
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the development of integration within the European Community might be more 
state-centred and therefore conceptionally less unique than assumed. And (neo-) 
functional ideas had gained so much relevance within international relations 
theory at large that Haas expressly called for the inclusion of regional integration 
into, and its subordination to, the study of changing patterns of interdepen-
dence.25 
Interdependence and Issue Area-specific Cooperation 
Central neo-functional ideas were especially blossoming in the study of inter-
national interdependence.26 Like neo-functionalism, this area of international 
relations theorising was clearly directed against the traditional narrow power 
orientation of realism. It paid attention to the relevance of functional cooperation 
in world politics and the participation of non-state actors therein. It emphasised 
the role of lower level communication among functional bureaucracies27 and the 
importance of "organisation" and multilateral negotiations as independent ex-
planatory factors beyond power.28 Keohane and Nye developed "complex inter-
dependence" as an ideal type of relationship within the international system 
diametrically opposed to the realist type.29 
The interest in "international regimes" as a new area of study was rooted in 
this neo-functionally informed branch of international relations theorising.30 
When Ruggie proclaimed that "international relations were institutionalised",31 
it had become clear for some years that the horizontal structure of the inter-
national system did not preclude the emergence of institutions that mattered 
because they were capable of influencing the behaviour of actors, and accord-
ingly the outcomes of situations. However, the concept of international regimes 
was far from clearly outlined. Originally regimes were not more than somehow 
stabilised patterns of interdependence.32 Only much later they became expressly 
understood as outcomes of negotiations, that is as arrangements that were 
deliberately established by the actors concerned to foster their own interests.33 In 
contrast to realists, regime theorists assumed that states have separate interests 
in different issue-areas and not a stable hierarchy of interests with security at its 
top. Opportunities for cooperation would then depend on the particular condi-
25. Ibid., p. 88. 
26. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge 
CA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
27. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations", World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1974), pp. 39-62. 
28. Ernst B. Haas, "Is there a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the 
Construction of International Regimes", International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1975), pp. 827-875. 
29. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston/Toronto: Little Brown, 1977). 
30. See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, "On Systems and International Regimes", World Politics, Vol. 27, 
No. 2 (1975), pp. 147-174; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, op. cit. 
31. John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends", International 
Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1975), pp. 557-583. 
32. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, op. cit. 
33. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited", International 
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1987), pp. 725-753; Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International 
Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Programme", in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime 
Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 23-45. 
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turns prevailing within a given issue-area. Accordingly, international regimes 
were necessarily issue-area specific and their shape was largely determined by 
the structure of the respective issue-area (hence, again "form followed function"). 
However, while it was clear that technological, economic, and later environ-
mental cooperation would almost throughout affect the interests of sub-national 
actors, the regime concept did not pay particular attention to interest groups and 
other sub-national actors. Moreover, the assumed issue-area specificity of inter-
national regimes made it difficult to accommodate another central concern of 
functionalism, namely the "spill over" concept. While the possibility of dynam-
ically expanding substantive cooperation within the international system was 
not denied, it was expected normally to take place in the form of the emergence 
of new regimes within separate issue-areas. Conceptionally, dynamics was 
beyond a theoretical approach that took specific arrangements as its units of 
analysis. 
These modifications hardly reduced the importance of the new approach 
because it was precisely the highly overestimated relevance of spill over in the 
case of the European Community and the lacking emergence of a Haasian "new 
political community" that had led to the revocation of neo-functionalism. In 
essence early regime theory primarily dropped the unsuccessful elements of the 
original neo-functionalism. Hence, the regime concept of the late 1970s did not 
only attract some important neo-functionalist scholars,34 it may be considered as 
the true successor of neo-functionalism. The central message of regime theory 
toward neo-functionalism was that states might (in their own interest) play a 
positive role in organising international relations, rather than merely being the 
opponents and victims of political integration. Implicitly, international relations 
theory offered international regimes as the suitable units of comparison for the 
European Community. 
Regime theorists claimed that institutions could matter and change behaviour 
even under conditions of international anarchy. When Waltz35 developed struc-
tural neo-realism and submitted a theoretically clarified version of the realist 
argument based on a clear epistemology, some institutionalists accepted the 
Waltzian methodology and reacted in defence of the institutionalist argument.36 
The "cooperation under anarchy" approach produced a lot of theoretical and, on 
that basis, empirical insights about the opportunities and limits of cooperation in 
the horizontally structured international system.37 Eventually it decided the long 
"neo-realist—neo-institutionalist debate" of belief about the power of institu-
tions in its favour.38 
34. This is especially true for Haas and Nye while other scholars of regional integration, for example 
Schmitter and I.indberg, retained the interest group orientation and directed their attention toward the 
study ot neo-corporatism in domestic political systems. 
35. Walt/, of. cit. 
3h. Duncan Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", International Organization, Vol. 34, 
No. 4 (1985), pp. 579-614; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University 1'ress, 1984). Keohane, ibid., p. 67, expressiv 
endeavoured to avoid the "smuggling in" of idealistic assumptions. 
37. Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy", World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985), pp. 
1-24; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy" World Politic* 
Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985), pp. 226-254. 
38. Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations: The Neo-realist—Neo-liberal Debate" 
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), pp. 313-344. 
Integrating Integration Theory 233 
In contrast to Waltzian neo-realism, the mainstream approach to regimes is 
still an institutional concept that is firmly located in the middle ground between 
realism and legalism. It emphasises the positive role of institutionalised cooper-
ation in the international system and draws attention to the opportunities for 
mutually beneficial cooperation depending on the constellation of interests 
among the participating actors within the issue-area concerned. However, its 
strict individualist methodology generates a practically state-centred and largely 
static concept of governance that precludes the exploration of feedback mecha-
nisms and the dynamics inherent in institutions. 
Although dominating the study of international regimes, the rationalistic 
mainstream does not monopolise it.39 A heterogeneous "reflective" (or better, 
"constructive") branch that has not yet been synthesised into a coherent rival 
approach to international regimes, emphasises a number of other aspects, for 
example the autonomous influence of institutions beyond cooperation among 
states, the relevance of norms and law and the possibility of (positive) feed-
back.40 Reflective contributions are in one way or another closer to the interde-
pendence-oriented origins of the regime concept of the 1970s than the dominant 
mainstream. They centre around the argument that an existing institution may 
(as an independent variable) affect not merely the behaviour, but also the 
interests of the member states. Hence, international regimes as empirically 
observable phenomena might be more than cooperative arrangements among 
rationally behaving state actors. And as a field of study international regimes 
must not be confused with a particular theoretical perspective. In short, the 
domination of the rational choice-based perspective toward international 
regimes does not invalidate the suitability of these institutions as units of 
comparison for the European Community. 
The Nexo Wave of European Community Studies 
Since the latter part of the 1980s the theoretically informed study of European 
integration attracted considerable renewed interest. Generally, contributions 
refrain from speculating about the institutional end-state of the integration 
process as well as from measuring integration. They take account of the lasting 
role of the member states, but generally emphasise the importance of sub-state 
and non-state actors. Surprisingly, it has been observed that the traditional 
divide between inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism continues to 
39. Roberto. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", International Studie* Quarterly, 
Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 379-396. 
40. Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regime* for Natural Resources and the Environment 
(Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1989); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On 
the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Andrew Hurrel, "International Society and the Study of Regimes: 
A Reflective Approach", in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1993), pp. 49-72; Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International 
Environmental Governance (Frankfurt/M: Lang, 1994). 
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structure the debate,41 with Moravcsik at one side,42 and Sandholtz, Marks and 
Sbragia at the other.43 
However, a second look reveals that this divide closely resembles the dispute 
between the rationalistic and the "reflectivist" (or "constructivist") branch of 
regime theory. To begin with, Moravcsik's "liberal inter-governmentalist" ap-
proach is not at all "realist" in the international relations understanding of the 
term. It does not in any way contradict the conception of the outcomes of the 
major European bargains as cooperative arrangements. Unlike Waltz, Moravcsik 
does not focus on positional advantages, nor does he derive state interests from 
the structure of the international system. Implicitly, he considers mutually 
beneficial cooperation generally possible. He supplements a "cooperation under 
anarchy approach" with a second level of analysis at which state interests are 
generated. In this way he may incorporate the generation of state interests into 
the analysis, but not the genesis of the preferences of the constitutive sub-state 
actors (i.e. powerful interest groups). Thus, Moravcsik's approach remains statist 
despite the far-reaching reduction of states to intermediaries of the interests of 
sub-state actors, because only states are assumed to bargain at the Community 
level. It is also static, because there is no feedback mechanism that would open 
the approach for (positive or negative) influence of an already established 
institution on the later generation of actors' preferences. Development does not 
take place within a concept of this type because it lacks a time perspective. 
In contrast, other contributors attribute more relevance to established institu-
tions and their effects for later rounds of decision-making.44 Significantly, for 
Sandholtz modern neo-functionalism is institutionalism,45 probably not least 
because in the case of the European Community institutional effects include the 
establishment and empowerment of supranational, subnational and transna-
tional actors. These actors are assumed to be capable of influencing the collective 
(supranational) decision process independently of the member states, rather than 
of merely acting through them. Accordingly, the assessment of the relevance of 
non-state actors is inseparably intertwined with the exploration of the impact of 
the established institution on outcomes. After all, the very existence of the 
Commission as the predominant supra-national actor may be attributed to the 
past integration process, and the role of regions as actors of a specific type may 
be interpreted as a direct effect of the preceding regional policy.46 From a 
theoretical point of view the institutional issue is clearly superior to the actor-
centred one. This implicit setting of priorities may be taken as indicating where 
the principal distinction between the European Community and "normal" 
international regimes might be found, namely in the realm of institutionalised 
organisation of collective decision processes. 
41. Caporaso and Keeler, op. <.'/(. 
42. Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act, op. cit.; Moravscik, Preferences and Power in the 
European Community, op. cit. 
43. Sandholtz, Choosing Union, op. cit.; Marks, Structural Policy in the European Community, op. cit.; 
Alberta M. Sbragia, "Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison", in Sbraeia on 
cit., pp. 257-291. 
44. Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain", World Politics, Vol. 
42,_No. 1 (1989), pp. 95-128; Marks, Structural Policy m the European Community, op. cit. 
45. Sandholtz, Choosing Union, op. cit., p. 2. 
46. Marks, Structural Policy in the European Community, op. cit. 
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The preceding discussion allows some conclusions to be drawn about the state 
of integration theory. The present debate is not a matter of prediction about 
whether the process of European integration will eventually lead to the emerg-
ence of a full-fledged federal state. It is not conducted between those flatly 
denying the influence of institutions in the horizontally structured ("anarchic") 
international system and those endeavouring to discover factors that might 
nevertheless allow institutionally supported cooperation to partially overcome 
international anarchy. It is not a dispute between those predominantly focusing 
on high politics and relative gains and those advocating progress in positive 
sum "low politics" areas. In short, it is not the debate of the 1950s and 1960s 
between realists and neo-functionalists, nor is it the debate of the 1980s between 
realists and neo-institutionalists (regime theorists). Rather, the dispute is be-
tween those denying the independent influence of institutions beyond the mere 
stabilisation of mutually beneficial cooperation among states on the basis of a 
given constellation of preferences and those attributing to institutions a certain 
degree of influence on the generation of actors' preferences. Hence, the dispute 
takes place within the intermediate theoretical camp and centres around the 
appropriate conception of the present European Community. In this regard, it 
seems to repeat a very similar debate between rationalists and reflectivists about 
the influence of international regimes on state actors. 
Institutionalised International Governance 
The discussion of the last sub-section suggests that the institutional analysis of 
the Community, rather than the issue of the relative importance of state and 
non-state actors within the Community might constitute the key to the solution 
of the dispute.47 From Lindberg's early observation of the relevance of collective 
decision-making it may be concluded that institutions of this type are not least 
of interest because they organise and support collective decision processes. 
Finally, the regime concept reminds that there must be substantial advantage for 
the actors concerned for institutionalised cooperation to emerge under condi-
tions of international anarchy. The present section endeavours to develop a 
clear-cut concept of "institutionalised international governance" that accommo-
dates these three dimensions. 
International Anarchy and the Demand for Cooperation 
The major success of mainstream regime theory within the past 15 years may be 
attributed not least to its conceptional clarity that requires theoretically 
rigourous argumentation because it is based on parsimonious modelling rather 
than description of empirically observed complexity. It allows the theoretical 
argument to start from an assumed "state of nature", namely the anarchy of the 
international state system in which the relations of the units are not yet 
institutionalised (as they in fact are). It also makes quite simple and very little 
demanding assumptions about the state-actors, namely that they behave as 
unitary and rational utility maximisers. An approach of this type is thus 
47. Surprisingly, the institutional dimension of European Community studies has been recognised 
as being seriously underdeveloped so far, see Caporaso and Keeler, op. at., pp. 49-51. 
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designed to help analyse why actors may deliberately engage in establishing 
institutions even if they lack collective orientation. 
Under conditions of international anarchy rational egoists will usually not care 
about deliberate coordination and collective decision-making for its own sake. 
They will take the behaviour of their co-actors into account, but they will decide 
and act unilaterally. Similar to a market, outcomes of decision situations will 
emerge automatically as a consequence of decentralised decision-making and 
subsequent action. In many cases this implicit (market-like) coordination mech-
anism will produce results that cannot be improved in the absence of hierarchy 
because every change would disadvantage at least one actor involved. These 
situations lack a sufficiently high incentive for the participating actors to 
deliberately organise their interaction differently from market-like coordination. 
However, the analysis of strategic action reveals that there are situations in 
which all actors could be better off, if they chose a different behaviour than their 
myopic interests (preferences) recommended.48 In these situations the participat-
ing actors are collectively trapped in a dilemma. Even though they are still 
assumed to be exclusively interested in maximising their own utility, they have 
"mixed motives". Collective action would improve their individual outcomes, if 
it could be brought about. Hence, cooperation among egoistic and rational actors 
is not entirely impossible, but it may be difficult to establish and sustain. 
Cooperation theory draws attention to the substantive dimension of establish-
ing institutions that facilitate cooperation, namely the desire to realise mutual 
benefits. It emphasises that the demand for cooperative institutions depends on 
the particular constellation of preferences prevailing within a given issue-area. 
And it outlines the substantive function of these institutions. They should help 
overcome the cooperation problem and for that purpose modify the preferences 
of the member states so that individually rational behaviour and collective 
demands coincide and the actors are motivated to adapt their behaviour in a 
way that promises improved outcomes both collectively and individually. Im-
plicitly, cooperation theory already indicates what international governance may 
be about, namely the establishment of a mechanism by which actors may 
purposively coordinate their behaviour in a way that overcomes the failures of 
market-like coordination.49 
48. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Croups (Cambridge CA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965); Rüssel Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982); Keohane, After Hegemony, op. cit.; Duncan Snidal, "The Uimits of Hegemonic 
Stability Theory", 17). cit.; Michael Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen in der Internationalen Politik. 
Grundlegung und Anwendungen des sititationsstrukturellen Ansatzes (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1992); 
Otto Keck, "Die Bedeutung der rationalen Institutionentheorie für die Politikwissenschaft", in Gerhard 
Cöhler (ed.), Die Eigenart der Institution: Zum Profil politischer Institutionentheorie (Baden-Baden- Nomos 
1994), pp. 187-220. 
49. On international governance, see James N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order and Change in World 
Politics", in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order 
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-29; Beate 
Kohler-Koch, "Die Welt regieren ohne Weltregierung", in Carl Bohret and Göttrik Wewer (eds.), 
Regieren im 23. Jahrhundert—Zwischen Globalisierung und Regkmalisierung (Opladen: Ueske & Budrich, 
1993), pp. 109-141; Thomas Gehring, "Regieren im internationalen System. Verhandungen, Normen 
und internationale Regime", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1995), pp. 197-219. 
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International Governance and Collective Decision-making 
Outlining the demand for cooperative institutions within a group of actors does 
not yet indicate the process by which a collective-action dilemma is transformed 
into cooperation. Axelrod argued from a behavioural point of view that cooper-
ation may emerge from repeated interaction alone,50 especially if direct reciproc-
ity51 is applicable. In this case the cooperation problem dissolves tacitly. Over 
time optimal outcomes are realised by market-like coordination alone. However, 
there may be instances in which cooperation is not realised automatically or as 
rapidly as desirable. In such cases a group of actors may be inclined actively to 
intervene and facilitate its emergence. These actors would desire to coordinate 
their behaviour differently from the established market mechanism. 
A group of actors commonly intending to deliberately bring about collectively 
and individually improved outcomes must actively influence the decisions and 
behaviour of its members. It requires appropriate instruments for this purpose. 
At this state of social development the group is not at all able to act indepen-
dently of its members. It does also not (yet) dispose of power and resources (e.g. 
money) independently of them. However, within the group of actors social 
norms may develop that orient the decisions of actors and influence their 
behaviour. Norms are under collective "control" inasmuch as they are beyond 
the grip of the single actors, even the more powerful, in horizontal societies. 
They may constitute a basic instrument for purposive collective governance. 
Norms are an almost ubiquitous phenomenon. Even the automatic emergence 
of cooperation from repeated interaction according to Axelrod does not exclude 
that norms ("conventions") arise tacitly or "spontaneously". Although these 
norms do not demand active adaptations of actors' behaviour, they may be 
relevant for rational egoists. They reflect and stabilise expectations about appro-
priate behaviour and delimitate the boundary between cooperation and defec-
tion.52 If the rationality of the deciding actors is "bounded" by the limitation of 
their information processing capacity and the complexity of decision situations/3 
spontaneous norms may intervene into the decision process. They become 
independent sources of influence to the degree to which decision-makers rely on 
their assistance.54 Institutions of this simple type are conceptionally unproblem-
atic because they emerge solely from repeated action among a number of actors. 
The relevant actors interact exclusively by a sequence of unilaterally determined 
action and generate social norms as a by-product of their interaction. 
50. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
51. On the difference between direct and diffuse reciprocity, see Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity 
in International Relations", International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1986), pp. 1-27. 
52. See Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2nd edn, 1980); Keck, Die 
Bedeutung der rationalen Institutionentheorie für die Politikicisscnschaft, op. eit. 
53. On bounded rationality, see Herbert A. Simon, "Theories of Bounded Rationality", in C.B. 
McGuire and Roy Radner (eds.), Decision and Organization (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1972), pp. 
161-176; reprinted in Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol. 2 (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
1982). 
54. On the relevance of norms for interest-driven actors, see Uwe Schimank, "Erwartungssicherheit 
und Zielverfolgung. Sozialität zwischen Prisoner's Dilemma und Battle of the Sexes", Soziale Welt, Vol. 
43, No. 2 (1992), pp. 182-200; Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, op. at., pp. 370-373; Thomas 
Plumper, "Quasi-rationale Akteure und die Funktion internationaler Institutionen", Zeitschrift für 
internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1995), pp. 49-77. 
238 T. Gehring 
"Spontaneous regimes"55 generated in this way may contribute to stabilising 
established behaviour, but they are not suited for the purpose of active gover-
nance because by definition they follow the emergence of patterns of interaction. 
If norms are to become instruments for purposive intervention, they must be 
shaped independently of the interaction which they are intended to affect and 
their moulding must precede the adaptation of behaviour. These norms cannot 
emerge from action alone. Rather, the actors concerned must collectively estab-
lish a second sphere of interaction at which they do not immediately act but 
merely communicate about norms. A group of states may, for example, continue 
to pollute a regional sea (sphere of action) and simultaneously negotiate about 
a cooperative arrangement on the reduction of pollution (sphere of communi-
cation). Thus, the clear separation of a sphere of communication in which the 
actors collectively mould norms from a sphere of action in which they operate 
according to their unilaterally determined decisions is a prerequisite for purpo-
sive international governance.56 
The establishment of a sphere of communication has dramatic consequences 
for the social organisation of the relevant group of actors. It is this step that 
invests the group with the ability to adopt collective decisions beyond the 
control of the single members and independently of their individual behaviour. 
It establishes an institutional apparatus by which a group of state-actors may 
govern a limited sector of international relations. This institutional apparatus is 
a collective entity. It does not comprise the member states, because they continue 
to exist independently of it and do not sacrifice their ability to decide unilaterally 
about their behaviour. These states merely take part, in their common and 
individual interest, in the collective employment of instruments that make 
certain options of behaviour less attractive than others. 
It may be concluded that institutionalised international governance does not 
only comprise a substantive component relating to the gains of mutually 
beneficial cooperation but also a procedural component that relates to the 
making of collective decisions about norms within a sphere of communication. 
Cooperative arrangements, that is sets of norms, will be the outcome of this 
procedural component. In contrast, cooperation is realised within the sphere of 
action, if actors adapt their behaviour accordingly. 
Organising the Collective Decision Process 
The establishment of an institutional apparatus for international governance 
does not transform the horizontal structure of the international system into a 
hierarchical order. Generally, successful international governance relies on three 
conditions, namely: (a) that collective decisions are actually adopted (procedural 
dimension); (b) that they are acceptable to the actors concerned and do not 
preclude implementation (substantive dimension); and (c) that they actually 
affect behaviour. The first two aspects may be directly affected by the appropri-
ate organisation of the collective decision process, while the last one is merely 
55. Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes" International 
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), pp. 277-297. 
56. Gehring, Regieren im internationalen System, op. cit. 
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subject to indirect influence because it remains under control of the single actors 
concerned. 
Negotiations constitute a form of communication that is particularly well-
suited for coordination in horizontal societies. It allows collective decision-mak-
ing in the mode of bargaining. Rational egoists may pursue their interests by 
resorting to their power resources that are in international negotiations generally 
reflected in credible threats to use the "exit-option".57 Within negotiations, 
bargaining is directed at balancing existing preferences and distributing joint 
gains. It is a necessary component of the communicative process of collective 
norm-moulding because it ensures that cooperation does not leave the area of 
overlapping interests. Even if negotiations are limited to pure bargaining, 
organisation of communication matters. The relevant constellation of interests 
may be collectively manipulated by adding or subtracting actors and subjects.58 
Moreover, in the case of multilateral negotiations the sheer complexity of 
bilateral relations may motivate the actors to, implicitly or explicitly, accept 
limits to participation in the initial round.59 Even then, exclusive bargaining may 
jeopardise the successful conclusion of negotiations because it threatens to 
engage the actors in a zero sum (i.e. purely distributive) conflict.60 
However, negotiations constitute a form of verbalised interaction and there-
fore allow the exchange of reasonable arguments.61 Negotiators may attempt to 
convince their co-actors of the reasonableness of their proposals on the basis of 
commonly accepted criteria. Hence, the actors may mobilise a second source of 
influence (beyond bargaining power) to pursue their individual interests. This 
mode of interaction, arguing, is directed at the convergence, and that is, active 
modification, of actors' preferences. It may contribute not only to identifying but 
also to developing the area of common interests of the actors concerned.62 
Obviously, decision-making in negotiations will be facilitated if bargaining is 
as far as possible limited to the distribution of joint gains, while arguing is 
employed to identify areas of mutual cooperation. Generally, even rational 
egoists will accept decisions derived at by arguing based on compelling criteria 
that are relevant for their own decision-making. This is especially true for issues 
57. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty—Responses to Decline in Finns, Organizations, ami 
States (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
58. James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetics: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties", 
International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1983), pp. 281-316. 
59. Fritz W. Scharpf, "Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen", in Adrienne 
Heritier (ed.), Policy-Analyse: Kritik und Neuorientierung, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 24 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), pp. 57-83; M.W. Pinto, "Modern Conference Techniques: 
Insights from Social Psychology and Anthropology", in R.St.J. MacDonald and Douglas M. Johnson 
(eds.), The Structure and Process of International law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), pp. 305-339. 
60. David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and 
Competitive Gain (New York: Free Press, 1986). 
61. Jürgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien", in H. Fahrenbach (ed.), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, 
Festschrift für Walter Schulz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973), pp. 211-265; Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 1: Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (Frankfurt/M: 
Suhrkamp, 2nd edn, 1982). 
62. Thomas Gehring, "Arguing und Bargaining in internationalen Verhandlungen zum Schutz der 
Umwelt. Überlegungen am Beispiel des Ozon schutzregimes", in Volker von Prittwitz (ed.), Verhandeln 
und Argumentieren: Dialog, Interessen und Macht in der Umweltpolitik (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996), 
pp. 207-238. 
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of pure knowledge (cognitive issues), while matters of pure preference and 
parochial choice are less suited for mutually acceptable settlement by arguing. A 
group of rational utility maximisers desiring to realise cooperation may thus in 
their own interest agree to collectively establish a fair procedure to settle some 
issues according to acceptable criteria, while retaining other issues for settlement 
by power-based bargaining. Accordingly, a collective decision process may be 
fostered by its separation into a number of semi-autonomous decision processes 
that discharge limited, functionally dependent tasks within a comprehensive 
negotiation.63 
Expert committees are a typical example for this type of semi-autonomous 
decision-making. Functionally, they are set up to relieve the core negotiations 
from discussing technical issues on which the actors are uncertain. They reduce 
the danger that these issues become intermingled with the pursuit of parochial 
interests by the negotiating state actors. Therefore, expert groups may discharge 
their task only if they do not operate according to the same criteria as political 
negotiations do. For that reason they may open the negotiation system beyond 
the limited group of member states and provide some leverage for non-govern-
mental actors, for example scientists and relevant industries. 
Eventually the results of a functionally dependent decision process must be 
introduced into the core political negotiations. In a horizontal structure, states 
cannot usually be forced to accept the outcome of an expert deliberation (this 
would already constitute a hierarchical dimension). However, results constitute 
themselves "arguments" that force the negotiators to decide. Either they prefer 
to exploit the relief function—and accept the results; or they reject them and 
sacrifice the assistance offered by the expert group. 
Hence, horizontal coordination and collective decision-making among states 
does not imply that states merely balance their unilaterally established interests. 
It does not even mean that they decide all issues themselves. The skilful 
organisation of collective decision processes matters, non-state actors may par-
ticipate in semi-autonomous decision processes and state preferences may be 
affected during collective decision processes. But these sources of influence are 
relevant only within the framework of a comprehensive negotiation process that 
is itself part of the endeavour of a group of state-actors to govern a limited area 
of international relations. 
International Regimes as Institutions for International Governance 
If international regimes are conceived of as institutions for purposive inter-
national governance, they will necessarily be composed of two different ele-
ments, namely a communication process about norms and the result of this 
process, a set of commonly moulded norms to regulate a given issue-area in the 
63. Alfons Bora, "Gesellschaftliche Integration durch Verfahren. Zur Funktion von Verfahrens-
gerechtigkeit in der Technikfolgenabschätzung und-bewertung", Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziolo?ic, Vol. 14, 
No. 1, pp. 55-79. 
64. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, op. eil, pp. 37<M00. In contrast, the widely applied 
'consensus defmrtion" defines international regimes merely as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converged in a given 
area of international relations"; Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences" 
International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 186. 
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The substantive component must be closely adapted to the constellation of 
interests in the issue-area in order to become effective, because self-interested 
actors will refuse to implement norms that run counter to their interests—and in 
the absence of hierarchy nothing would prevent them from doing so. For that 
reason the participating states must in the end voluntarily agree on the cooper-
ative arrangement hammered out during the preceding negotiations. Yet, this 
does not imply that other (i.e. non-state) actors are precluded from intervening 
into the collective decision process, it merely means that they may be successful 
only to the degree to which the negotiating states accept (i.e. are convinced by) 
their interventions. In short, in this type of international negotiations states may 
argue and bargain, while other actors are limited to pursuing their interests by 
arguing. Also, it does not imply that non-compliance with agreed upon norms 
will be costless. It merely means that the group as a collective entity will hardly 
be able to enforce its norms against states in the Weberian sense.65 Rather, the 
power to sanction compliance and enforce non-compliance must come from 
other member states, and that is, it will be channelled horizontally, not verti-
cally. 
There is another important aspect about regime-supported cooperation in the 
horizontally structured international system. The benefits of cooperation may be 
realised only if the participating states implement the commonly agreed norms 
and adapt their behaviour accordingly. However, in numerous low-politics areas 
measures to achieve cooperation do not only require immediate state action but 
also affect the behaviour (and the interests) of relevant sub-state actors. Cooper-
ating states must therefore be powerful enough to enforce appropriate behaviour 
domestically. Accordingly, successful international governance relies—at least to 
some degree—on a sufficiently strong hierarchical relationship between the 
participating states and their sub-units. 
Altogether regime-supported international cooperation in low politics issue-
areas may be conceived of as operating according to the following three-level 
model. In the upward (norm-moulding) process unit-level interests influence the 
aggregate national interests which governments pursue during an international 
negotiation. The national interests of the participating states influence, in turn, 
the collective decision process about norms that defines the common interests of 
the participating state-actors. In the downward (norm-applying) process collec-
tively agreed norms orient decision-making by states. State-action, in turn, 
commands sub-unit actors to adapt their behaviour accordingly. Beyond this 
general relationship there may be some direct impact of sub-state actors on the 
collective decision process and some direct impact of regime norms on sub-state 
actors. 
It is important to note, however, that there need not be any actor at the 
collective level. This level is the location for collective decision processes and 
collectively agreed norms. Conceptionally, the community of states decides and 
acts exclusively through its members.b6 
65. Max Weber, Wirtschaft unit Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie (Tübingen: Mohr, 
edn, 1972), p. 28. 
66. However, real-world multilateral international regimes usually comprise a, generally wc 
secretariat that forms the nucleus of an independent actor located at the collective level. 
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Figure 1. Regime-supported international cooperation in low politics issue-areas. 
The European Community as a Regime-like International Institution 
This conception applies to virtually all international regimes, including sophisti-
cated ones like the world trade regime (World Trade Organisation—WTO) and 
the regime for the protection of the ozone layer. From an international relations 
perspective the model also seems to fit the European Community surprisingly 
well. Like an international regime the Community has been founded by its 
member states to realise mutual gains in certain areas of international relations. 
Like an international regime, it has emerged from international anarchy. Like 
lasting international regimes of the WTO-type it consists of several cooperative 
arrangements that were hammered out in successive rounds of inter-govern-
mental negotiations. The most important of these arrangements are the Paris 
Treaty on the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Rome 
treaties on the establishment of the two other Communities, the Single European 
Act with its Single Market programme, and the Maastricht Treaty with the 
agreement on Monetary Union. 
In this type of cooperation the group of original actors remains limited to the 
member states, despite the influence of non-state actors on certain aspects of the 
negotiations.6' Only the member states are able to promote their interests within 
the collective decision process by arguing and by bargaining. For them the exit 
option is the primary source of bargaining power. A member state will refuse to 
accept the outcome of a negotiation unless it anticipates benefits. As in regular 
international negotiations the actors may react in three ways on the threat of exit 
by one member state. They may accept a higher degree of compromise. They 
may (threaten to) cooperate within a smaller group, or they may accept the 
failure of negotiations. In the final result, the major cooperative arrangements 
hammered out within the framework of the European Community constitute 
packages that carefully balance the interests of the member states. Moreover, like 
an international regime the Community lacks almost any serious sanctioning 
power against its member states. In the hypothetical case that a member state 
considers its interests better protected outside rather than within the Com-
munity, nothing would hinder it to leave the institution, irrespective of the 
horizontal 
hierarchical 
67. Sbragia, Thinking about the European Future, op. cit., pp. 272. 
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formal legal situation.68 Hence, similar to other cases of international cooperation 
the availability of the exit-option effectively relates the sphere of action where 
commonly adopted norms will have to be implemented, to the sphere of 
communication, where actors negotiate cooperative arrangements. 
All actors other than the member states do not dispose of immediately 
applicable power resources during this type of negotiations. Even if they have 
direct access to the negotiation forum, they are constrained to affecting the 
decision process either by arguing or by first influencing the interests of a 
state-actor. None of them is able to bargain and "force" the member states to 
adopt an agreement which they do not collectively desire. Hence, even though 
the European Community comprises actors at the collective level, for example 
the Commission, these actors do not dispose of independent power resources. 
Last but not least, like international governance in low-politics areas European 
governance relies almost entirely on the hierarchical structure of the member 
states vis-ä-vis their sub-units. Generally it is for the member states to ensure 
that economic actors and citizens comply with European law. 
Accordingly, the European Community may be interpreted as a particularly 
successful case of international cooperation.69 The member states "pool their 
sovereignty"70 in areas in which they expect mutual gains, but they do not lose 
their exclusive role as powerful actors within the system, nor their ability to act 
independently, if appropriate.71 
Institutionall}/ Created Hierarchical Governance within the European Community 
Despite these striking similarities to regular international regimes wide-spread 
doubt exists whether the Community is really in the first place an international 
institution for the promotion and maintenance of horizontal cooperation among 
states. Is not the role of Community-specific actors, like the Commission and the 
Court, as well as that of non-state actors so important that the Community 
system reflects some undeniable aspects of hierarchical governance vis-ä-vis its 
member states despite the lack of sanctioning power? May the member states 
still be perceived as unitary actors despite their action through a multitude of 
sub-unit actors (e.g. functional bureaucracies, national banks, courts)? Does not 
decision-making within the Community in many respects resemble more closely 
domestic political decision processes than international negotiations, and is not 
the Community therefore more appropriately compared with a federal state than 
with an international governing institution?72 
68. Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe", Yale Law journal, Vol. 100, No. 8 (1991), 
p. 2412. This is the basis for the "confederal" argument according to which the Community has not yet 
tacitly transformed into a federal state; Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 269-294. 
69. Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Aet, op. cit.; Moravscik, Preferences and Power in the 
European Community, op. cit. 
70. Keohane and Hoffmann, op. cit., pp. 10-13. 
71. Taylor, The Politics of the European Communities, op. cit.; Hoffmann, Reflections on the Nation-State 
in Western Europe Today, op. cit. 
72. Sbragia, Thinking about the European Future, op. cit.; Samuel Krislov, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and 
Joseph Weiler, "The Political Organs and the Decision-Making Process in the United States and the 
European Community", in Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Secombe, Joseph Weiler (eds.), Integration Through 
Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986), Vol. 1, Book 2, pp. 3-110. 
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Theoretically, the question arises why the surprising similarity of the Com-
munity with international regimes diminishes as soon as decision processes 
within the institution are explored. From an institutionally informed perspective 
the characteristically incoherent perception of the Community may be attributed 
to the peculiar distribution of substantive cooperation and related decision-mak-
ing at two different levels.73 It is not uncommon in international relations that a 
regime defines the terms of cooperation and assigns executive and administrat-
ive decisions to a regime-specific decision-making apparatus.74 This is basically 
what the two sectoral communities on coal and steel and on nuclear energy did. 
However, the EEC-Treaty spells out detailed obligations only for some limited 
areas (e.g. the initial common market) while it assigns wide-spread competencies 
to the new decision-making apparatus in numerous other areas.75 This is 
illustrated by the fact that, in principle, the central elements of the two recent 
inter-governmentally negotiated cooperative arrangements, namely the Single 
Market programme and the Monetary Union, might well have been agreed upon 
within the framework of the established Economic Community. Consequently, 
far-reaching substantive cooperation may be achieved at two different levels, 
namely the upper level of inter-governmental negotiations and the lower level 
of intra-institutional decision-making.76 
The emergence of a lower level of cooperation does not deprive the member 
states of their central role as the original actors of the institution, but it turns 
them into multiple stake-holders. On the one hand, they have interests in 
cooperation at the upper level. Therefore, they will be inclined to avoid unnec-
essary destabilisation of the related major cooperative arrangements, even 
though these arrangements determine the procedural rules for lower-level 
decision-making. On the other hand, they have varying interests in numerous 
secondary issue-areas in which additional cooperative gains may be made by 
secondary cooperation. The institution forces a state-actor to subordinate one of 
his interests to the other. If he is primarily interested in upper level cooperation, 
he must confine himself to pursuing his interests in the lower level decision 
processes within the limits of existing procedural rules. If he considers his 
interests within a lower-level process important enough to disobey these limits 
and reject the procedural rules, he must withdraw his prior agreement at the 
upper level and may have to put into question his future participation in the 
institution at large. The French "policy of the empty chair" in 1965/66 illustrates 
this effect and draws attention to the enormous costs involved in employing this 
mechanism." 
73. Thomas Gehring, "Der Beitrag von Institutionen zur Förderung der internationalen Zusamme-
narbeit. Lehren aus der institutionellen Struktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft", Zeit schritt für 
internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 211-242. 
74. Thomas Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes—Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems", 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Vol. 1 (1990), pp. 35-56. 
75. Taylor, The Polities of the European Communities, op. cit. 
76. Below these two levels of legislative activity, there are other levels of executive and adjudicative 
decision-making. 
77. On the "policy of the empty chair", see Hans von der Groeben, Aufbaufahre der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft. Das Rmgen um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958-1966) (Baden-Baden-
Nomos 1982) pp. 268-285; John Lambert, "TheConstitutionalCnsis",,ournalofCommon Market Stud.es, 
Vol. 4, No. 3 (1966), pp. 195-228. 
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Hence, the particular organisation of the collective decision process merely 
forces a member state to choose among his various interests. It does not 
automatically close exit for lower-level decisions. However, the more important 
overall cooperation is compared to the interests at stake in a single lower level 
decision process, the less credible will be the threat of exit. Consequently, the 
closure of the exit option will become more effective with increasing differen-
tiation of lower-level decision-making. The numerous functional councils of 
which the Council of Ministers is composed78 and the participation of uncounted 
civil servants in the "bureaucratic politics" of the Community79 underline the 
current high degree of differentiation of the decision-making system. 
The effects of the closure of the exit-option are far-reaching.80 Now lower-level 
cooperation takes place under the protection of a strong international institution, 
rather then in the shadow of international anarchy. Governance is not limited to 
horizontal coordination of behaviour among the member states any more, it may 
become hierarchical to some degree. If the original state actors are inclined to 
accept decisions irrespective of their substantive content provided that they are 
adopted according to the accepted procedural rules, applicable power will no 
longer depend on resources beyond the institution. The member states may still 
bargain to pursue their interests, but they will do so on the basis of institution-
ally allocated power resources. It depends on the results of upper level negotia-
tions, for example, whether the institution assigns veto power to every single 
member state or grants a certain number of votes that may be used to influence 
decisions under majority voting.81 
The closure of the exit option and its replacement by procedural rules as the 
principal source of power for intra-institutional decisions has another important 
consequence. If the original state-actors depend on institutionally assigned 
power, other actors may be invested with the same sort of power. Accordingly, 
sub-state actors, such as companies, citizens as well as regions, derive certain 
powers from the institution. Probably even more important, new actors may be 
institutionally created and invested with power. The Commission with its 
exclusive right to initiate legislation, the Court of Justice with its competence to 
deliver binding judgements and the Parliament with its right to intervene 
substantially into the legislative decision process belong into this category. 
Even though these artificially created actors entirely owe their existence to the 
institution established within the international system, they become full-fledged 
participants in intra-institutional decision processes. Within these processes they 
fulfil certain functions. Hence, the Commission helps accelerate the cumbersome 
and time-consuming negotiation mechanism and serves as inferior-level (execu-
tive) decision-maker. The increasingly relevant Parliament contributes to 
78. Wolfgang Wessels, "The EC Council: The Community's Decisionmaking Center", in Robert O. 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change 
(Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 133-154. 
79. Guy B. Peters, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Community", in 
Sbragia, op. at., pp. 75-122; Maurizio Bach, "Eine leise Revolution durch Verwaltungsverfahren. 
Bürokratische Integrationsprozesse in der Europäischen Gerne inschaft", Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 
21, No. 1 (1992), pp. 16-30. 
80. Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism", 
Yearbook of European law, Vol. 11 (1981), pp. 267-306, identified an auxiliary closure of exit in the stage 
of implementation following from a well-operating adjudication mechanism that precludes free riding. 
81. Peters, op. cit., p. 83. 
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legitimating legislative decisions (even though it is still hardly responsible for 
their content). The Court removes normative (legal) ambiguities and thus serves 
to settle disputes and enhance compliance. 
The establishment of powerful institutional actors for intra-institutional de-
cision-making has important consequences. These actors cannot fulfil their 
functions properly unless they dispose of a margin of independent decision-
making determined by their position within the Community system. Outcomes 
of decision processes do not emerge any more exclusively from interaction 
among the member states, although the states still control the upper level 
process. The Council of Ministers becomes one organ of the European Com-
munity among others rather than an ordinary state conference.82 And that is, the 
collective level within the three-level-model is considerably strengthened vis-a-
vis the unit (state) level. In a typical international regime the collective level 
exists predominantly in the form of joint decision-making of the member states. 
Within the EC it acquires its own voice separately from the states, although not 
independently of them. 
The relevance of powerful institutional actors operating at the collective level 
is not limited to the relationship between the group of states and its members. 
These actors provide new inlets for interventions of sub-state actors. In some 
areas sub-unit actors enjoy a formal standing which provides them with direct 
access to intra-Community decision processes.83 Beyond that, interventions are 
not limited to be channelled via state actors any more. A projected directive may 
be effectively influenced by non-state actors through the Commission and, in 
some cases, the Parliament. 
All these effects increase the leverage of non-state actors at the supra-national 
and sub-national level. Inevitably they decrease, at least in relative terms, the 
ability of the original state actors to control the collective decision process. Yet, 
in a comprehensive approach toward the European Community one should not 
overlook that they rely on the peculiar organisation of the collective decision 
process that combines substantive cooperation at two different levels and firmly 
closes the exit option for lower-level decision-making. It is this specifically 
organised communication about norms that fundamentally distinguishes the 
Community from (other) international cooperative institutions. 
From Cooperation to Integration: Recognising the Relevance of Development 
Over Time 
The concept as developed so far is still static. It takes account of the relevance 
of the established institution and may help structure empirical inquiry into the 
82. Wessels, op. cit. 
83. For example the "new approach" to standardisation envisages a central role for interest group 
negotiations within European standardisation organisations, see Christian Joerges Josef Falke 
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz and Gert Brüggemeier, Die Sicherheit von Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988); Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow 
"Ko-Evoluhon polihsch-administrativer und verbandlicher Strukturen: Am Beispiel der technischen 
Harmomsierung des europäischen Arbeits-, Verbraucher- und Umweltschutzes", in Wolfgang Streek 
ot i ; ^ , ™ r , l T V,ertel!ahr^h"fl Sonderheft 25 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
n the Z l aV \ i 7 ^ ^ " 1 7 7 P r ° C e d u r e a s s ' 8 " s *> C r e s t e d P ^ a t e parties a central rofe 
m the judicial control of comphance with EC-norms, see Weiler, The Transformation of Europe op cit 
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origins of specific events taking place within the institution as well as into the 
state of integration at a certain point in time. Integration itself, however, is a 
notion of process rather than status. It requires a perspective of development 
over time. If the institution, i.e. the combination of the specific organisation of 
collective decision-making and cooperative norms as outcomes of this process, 
constitutes the core of the phenomenon, integration will have to do with 
institutional change. Hence, a concept of integration must accommodate institu-
tional development. 
Path-dependence and Institutional Development 
Some theoretical concepts, like the "cooperation under anarchy" approach and 
Moravcsik's "liberal inter-governmentalist approach", reduce governance to 
substantive cooperation among a group of actors and the underlying constel-
lation of preferences prevailing within a given issue-area.84 From this perspec-
tive a significant change of the underlying constellation of preferences produces 
a new situation that replaces the original one. The new situation is conceived of 
as not being connected in any way to the original one. Likewise, a later 
cooperative arrangement is not related to a preceding one but emerges from 
"international anarchy". Accordingly, changing patterns of cooperation must be 
interpreted either as a series of successive arrangements or as the proliferation 
of parallel cooperation in different issue-areas. This may lead to the conclusion 
that institutional development over time is not an important aspect of institu-
tionalised international governance. Yet, this conclusion is largely related to the 
fact that development of cooperation over time cannot be analysed on the basis 
of these concepts. 
To be sure, from an actor-oriented (i.e. methodologically individually in-
formed) theoretical perspective an institution does not gain a life of its own, 
even though it may appear to develop. It will merely influence decision-making 
by relevant actors in a way that relates otherwise unrelated successive events in 
a meaningful way. Accordingly, a twin set of interrelated issues arises, namely: 
(a) how does an existing institution affect the decisions of relevant actors; and (b) 
how do these decisions modify the institution in turn.8'' 
Once again, the limitation of information processing capacity of the participat-
ing actors and the complexity of decision situations have an important impact. 
Norms do not necessarily determine the decisions of actors deciding under 
conditions of bounded rationality. Single actors may well fail to comply and stir 
conflict over originally accepted norms. In international governing institutions 
with a permanently established collective decision-making apparatus these 
conflicts may be made subject to new, i.e. secondary collective decisions. If the 
existing norms are still accepted as valid standards, these decisions would 
amount to interpretations in light of the specific circumstances of the case. 
A dispute may also indicate that the original cooperative arrangement does 
not sufficiently reflect the actual constellation of preferences any more. In this 
84. Oye, op. cit.; Axelrod and Keohane, op. cit.; Moravcsik, Preference* and Power in the Europea 
Community, op. cit. 
85. Hartmut Esser, Soziologie. Allgemeine Grundlagen (Frankfurt/M: Campus, 1993); Zürn, op. a 
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case the conflict reaches beyond the closure of regulatory gaps in light of existing 
norms. It involves the challenge of a, possibly outdated, cooperative arrange-
ment. Certain cooperators may threaten to abandon cooperation and jeopardise 
the existence of the cooperative institution altogether unless costs and benefits 
are satisfactorily re-allocated. All actors may remain interested in continued 
collective governance of the relevant issue-area to realise improved outcomes, 
but some of them insist on an adjustment of the terms of the governing 
cooperative arrangement. Consequently, the governing institution continues to 
enjoy support, but a new arrangement must be negotiated within its framework. 
Although there is no general limit as to the issues that may be tabled by the 
participating actors in these negotiations, the existing agreement will be highly 
relevant for the negotiation process. The reason is the peculiar relationship 
between collective and individual interests in international governance. 
A core group of actors will continue to support the original terms of cooper-
ation, unless the net gains realised under the original arrangement diminish 
because of the exit of too many or too important cooperators. That is, the 
community as a collective entity will stay alive and cooperation will continue to 
flourish (albeit presumably at a lower level of net gains due to increased free 
riding) although some community members may drop out. In this typical 
situation of gradual decay a new cooperative arrangement may not replace the 
original one unless it wins a higher degree of support.86 This will be more likely 
and less risky if the original arrangement is adapted to the new situation, rather 
than abandoned and re-established. Accordingly, the existing arrangement es-
tablishes institution-specific baseline criteria that may be invoked during the 
negotiations. It structures the collective decision process even though it is the 
task of this process to identify a new arrangement that is better adapted to the 
new situation. Surprisingly enough, within a community of actors deciding 
under conditions of bounded rationality substantive norms establish a link 
between decision situations over time both when they are intended to be kept 
and when they are intended to be replaced. 
There are two other mechanisms that relate decision situations over time. 
Established cooperative arrangements always enshrine a regulatory solution to 
a common problem87 which may be used as a point of reference when dealing 
with similar problems. A group of actors deciding and acting under conditions 
of bounded rationality will not always be aware which one out of a number of 
competing regulatory approaches will best exploit the existing margin for 
cooperation.** For the group at large a mutually agreed solution in a parallel 
field will constitute a widely acceptable standard for the appraisal of proposals, 
despite the fact that individual preferences vary according to differing cognitive 
86. If the threshold for decision-making is high and the group of p articipants is firmly established, 
the cooperators may alternatively find themselves locked in the "joint decision trap"; see Fritz W. 
Scharpf, "Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im 
Vergleich", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1985), pp. 323-356. 
87. Giandomenico Majone, "Policies as Theories", OMEGA, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1980), pp. 151-162. 
88. Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the 
European Community's Internal Market", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993) pp 
173-206. 
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insights and parochial interests. An existing regulatory approach which might 
not have been intended to influence later decisions may thus be taken as the 
foundation for community-specific arguments that may be refuted only by 
proposals that are "better" either because they are more appropriate to the 
substantive problem or more acceptable to the community of actors. Hence, an 
existing solution to a parallel problem may exert influence on the structure of a 
later decision process,89 whether or not it is eventually adopted. In this sense, 
solutions may precede problems rather than follow them.90 
Lastly, procedural norms constitute a form of linkage between decisions over 
time. They reflect collective decisions that are most directly intended to affect 
later collective decisions. It is well-known that procedures may have an impact 
on the outcome of decision processes if the actors concerned are inclined to 
accept the decisions rendered on their basis. Obviously, it matters whether a 
subsequent decision ought to be adopted by consensus or by a qualified majority 
of votes, and whether votes are weighted or distributed on a one-country-one-
vote basis. Likewise, it will affect the decision whether a dispute is settled by an 
adjudicative dispute-settlement organ, or by the stake-holders themselves. The 
task of procedures is to facilitate decision-making, to accelerate and/or rational-
ise (in a discursive understanding) the cumbersome and time-consuming nego-
tiation process, and to define the bargaining space.91 
To conclude, there are several mechanisms by which an established institution 
may exert influence on rational egoists as soon as they are forced to decide and 
act under conditions of bounded rationality. In all these cases an existing 
institution intervenes into the calculation of preferences of these actors and the 
collective process of hammering out secondary decisions. Under bounded 
rationality it matters whether a group of actors endeavours to establish a 
cooperative arrangement out of a state of anarchy, or whether it develops, 
elaborates or adapts to new circumstances a governing institution that already 
exists. Every decision made within the framework of an existing institution adds 
to that institution and modifies its future appearance. Over time the institution 
develops because of the numerous collective decisions adopted at the various 
levels of its decision-making apparatus. 
tion Positive Feedback and Integrate 
Many important international regimes, such as the WTO or the regime on 
long-range transboundary air pollution dispose of a twin structure that links 
several parallel or succeeding cooperative arrangements to a comparatively 
89 Johan P Olsen, "Political Science and Organization Theory. Parallel Agendas but Mutual 
Disregard", in Adrienne Wind hoff-Heritier and Roland Czada (eds.), Political Choice. Institutions, Rules, 
and the Limits of Rationally (Frankfurt/M: Campus, 1991), pp. 87-119. 
90 International governing institutions with a permanent decision-making apparatus may thus 
reflect aspects of the "garbage can" phenomenon originally observed in domestic orgamsahons; see 
Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizahonal 
Choice", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1972), pp. 1-25. 
91 Niklas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 3rd edn, 1978); Gehnng, 
"Arguing und Bargaining" internationalen Veredlungen zum Schutz der Umwelt, op. at. 
250 T. Gehring 
stable institutional framework.92 In these cases, collective decision-making about 
norms continues upon adoption of a first set of governing norms. Therefore, it 
may lead to the adoption of further sets of norms that prescribe different 
behaviour to realise other common interests of the actors as soon as the relevant 
constellation of interests so requires or allows. 
It is the combination of the original cooperation-centred mainstream approach 
with an institutionally oriented concept of international governance that opens 
the regime concept for inquiry into this dynamic development of international 
governing institutions. The conceptional separation and functional re-integration 
of interest-based cooperation and institutions established to organise cooper-
ation draws attention to reflexive (feedback) mechanisms by which regimes may 
affect their own future development. In this regard, the present approach 
re-introduces a central functional and neo-functional idea into the analysis of 
international institutions. Empirically informed studies especially from the 
highly dynamic field of international environmental relations emphasise the 
relevance of feedback mechanisms for the development of cooperation over 
time.* Obviously, institutional development and feedback effects also matter in 
the case of European integration. 
Three categories of sources for dynamics and reflexive development may be 
distinguished analytically although they may actually appear in combination. 
First, an established international governing institution may foster future coop-
eration due to its very existence. Interested actors may simply exploit an already 
existing collective decision process that has proven to be effective in previous 
cases, once a new issue comes up for cooperation. For example, increased 
economic competition between Europe and the Pacific region may lead to the 
adoption of the Single Market programme,94 or German unification may remove 
interest-based obstacles to the acceptance of Monetary Union.95 The existing 
institution offers, in the case of the Community rather actively, its own solution 
to the new problem: expanding cooperation within its established framework. 
Without some responsiveness to changes in the environment an established 
institution may be expected either eventually to break down or lose its relevance 
for the actors concerned. However, in this pattern the relevance of feedback is 
still limited because the main cause of the expansion of cooperation is located 
beyond the institution's confines. 
Second, feedback may occur between the collective level and that of the units 
(member states). Purposive governance and collective decision-making may 
always lead to a (partial) redefinition of actors' preferences. Verbalised exchange 
92. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, op. cit. On the "nesting" of institutions, see the rather 
preliminary remarks by Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", International 
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 334; and Vinod K. Aggarval, Hanging by a Thread: International 
Regime Change in the Textile/Apparel System, 1950-1979 (Stanford: Ph.D., 1981), pp. 8-16; Vinod K. 
Aggarval, "The Unraveling of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, 1981: An Examination of International 
Regime Change", International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1983), p. 620. 
93. Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Ronald B. Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters: International Oil 
Pollution and Treaty Compliance", International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3 (1994), pp. 425-458; 
Sebastian Oberthür, Der Beitrag internationaler Regime zur Lösunv von Umweltproblemen (Berlin- Ph D 
1995). ' 
94. Sandholtz and Zysman, op. cit. 
95. Sandholtz, op. cit. 
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during negotiations may draw attention to—originally underestimated or misin-
terpreted—aspects of the substantive problem underlying cooperation 
("arguing"). For example, the establishment of the international regime on global 
climate change may contribute to raising the awareness of the participating state 
actors for the underlying problem and, consequently, affect an actor's perception 
of the problem. Likewise, commonly adopted norms may have a stabilising 
effect, if effective, because they converge the expectations of the Community 
members and orient their decisions of behaviour. This is true for international 
governing institutions at large. However, within the European Community this 
type of feedback is dramatically strengthened because the Community acquires 
the ability to intervene into collective decision-making separately from the 
member states. The participation of the Commission and the Parliament in 
norm-moulding and, even more fundamental, the rulings of the Court on the 
basis of valid norms are examples. Accordingly, the dramatic development of 
European law may be conceived of as a consequence of interaction between the 
collective and the unit (state) level.96 Moreover, the different actors operating at 
the collective level may themselves interact and attempt to reinforce the impact 
of this feedback mechanism.97 
Third, arrangements designed to bring about cooperation in a dilemma 
situation will cause adaptations to the behaviour of the actors concerned, if 
effective. In all low-politics issue-areas in which the cooperating states do not, or 
do not fully, control the regulated activities this mechanism automatically affects 
the interests of sub-state actors. If sub-state actors adjust to the new require-
ments and subsequently lose their interest in its modification this may have a 
stabilising effect. If it triggers activities of sub-state actors that provide, in turn, 
additional margins for cooperation in later rounds, it may have a dynamising 
effect.98 In both cases adaptation of state behaviour has a long-term impact on 
the preferences of the relevant state. While developments of this third category 
come about as a consequence of an established institution and produce effects on 
that institution later on, they involve intermediate changes of substantive 
interests at the sub-state level. They are thus very close to the traditional 
functional and neo-functional "spill-over" mechanism. 
To conclude, the present concept is not at all static. It appreciates institutional 
development over time as well as the sources of changes. It is applicable to 
international governing institutions that combine substantive cooperative ar-
rangements and permanent collective decision-making processes. This is true for 
dynamic international regimes as well as for institutions with a "supra-national 
constitution"99 and even for a federation in the analytical understanding of the 
96. Hence, the margins of freedom enjoyed by the European Court need not be interpreted either 
as virtually unlimited, or as non-existent. For the two positions, see Burley and Mattli, op. cil., and 
Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: the European Community's 
Internal Market", International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 533-560. Rather, being strictly 
limited in respect of a single decision, rulings may over time produce dramatic consequences, if accepted 
by the member states. 
'97 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, "Judicial Politics in the European Community: 
European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 4 (1994), pp. 535-561. 
98. Oberthür, op. cit. 
99. Alec Stone, "What is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in International Relations Iheory , 
Review of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 3 (1994), pp. 441-474. 
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term.1"" Despite all their differences, these types of international governing 
institutions have central conceptional features in common that recommend a 
common approach.101 
However, the present concept does not predetermine the standard for measur-
ing and appraising the state of integration achieved at a given time. It keeps 
open the decision whether the success of European integration is best assessed 
according to its substantive dimension—the expansion of cooperation—or ac-
cording to its transnational dimension—the role of non-state actors compared to 
that of the member states within the decision-making system—or according to 
its systemic dimension—the strength of the institution in the light of irritations 
within its environment. 
Conclusion 
The present approach is inter-governmental in as far as it attributes a central role 
to states. Only states may establish international governing institutions in the 
shadow of international anarchy, like the six original members of the European 
Community did in 1951 and 1957. And only states may enter an existing 
international governing institution as did the three most recent members of the 
Community in 1995. By entering the Community these actors do not at all 
sacrifice their nature as states. Hence, states constitute a very special class of 
actors within the Community. 
However, the present approach is also institutional in the sense that it 
attributes particular relevance to institutions. Institutions do not act themselves 
vis-ä-vis their members, but they influence the decisions of relevant actors, may 
lead to the emergence of institutional actors and open new opportunities for 
action by other actors. Lastly, the approach is neo-functional not only because it 
recognises the relevance of non-state and sub-state actors within intra-institu-
tional decision-making processes but also because it accounts for development 
over time and feedback effects that might promote and accelerate the process of 
integration. 
Accordingly, inter-governmentalism on the one hand and institutionalism as 
well as neo-functionalism on the other hand are not at all two mutually 
incompatible concepts for the analysis of European integration. Rather, they 
focus on two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, the conceptional priority for 
the member states as the original actors does not necessarily entail the empiri-
cally explorable priority within a specific decision process. On the contrary, an 
international institution established by states may differentiate so much that 
non-state and sub-state actors actually begin to dominate relevant decision 
processes. However, this is not a suitable matter for deductively generated 
assumptions but an issue that should be settled by empirical investigation. 
The accommodation of the two rival approaches within a theoretically coher-
ent concept allows one to draw on the insights of the lasting debate on 
100. Sbragia, Thinking about the European Future, op. cit, 
101. However, the very notions seem to imply that a state may be a member of numerous 
international regimes but only of one "federation" simultaneously. Therefore, the decision to join, or 
to retreat from, a federation will have a larger effect on a state compared to a similar decision in relation 
to a single international regime. 
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international regimes. If the regime perspective is employed, it is of little 
assistance to ascertain that the European Community is "more than a regime",102 
or that only its sectoral arrangements could be conceived of as regimes.103 The 
central issue is of course not the purely definitional matter whether or not the 
European Community is an international regime. Rather, the core question 
might be how the existing institution actually affects the outcomes of particular 
decision processes. To put it differently, how would similar states have decided 
on the same matter in the shadow of international anarchy outside the institu-
tional framework of the European Community? From this perspective, the 
theoretically derived ideal-type of a cooperative arrangement might constitute 
the baseline-hypothesis, while differences would point at particular institutional 
influences. 
102. Wallace, op. cit. 
103 Carole Webb, "Theoretical Perspectives and Problems", in Helen Wallace, William Y\ 
Carole Webb (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Community (Chichester: Wiley, 1983), p. 
